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SECTION 22(d) OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY
ACT OF 1940-ITS ORIGINAL PURPOSE
AND PRESENT FUNCTION
JAMES V. HEFFERNAN* AND JAMES F. JORDEN**
The implementation of section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940
has resulted in a form of retail price maintenance in the mutual fund industry. The
justification for this anti-competitive situation has largely rested on the assumption
that section 22(d) was intended to eliminate price discrimination as between general
members of the purchasing public. In this article Messrs. Heffernan and Jorden
carefully examine the legislative history of section 22(d) and conclude that the
section was aimed, not at price discrimination in the above sense, but at value
dilution abuses resulting from riskless trading on the part of dealers, distributors
and mutual fund insiders. Finding that the specific abuses to which section 22(d)
was initially addressed have been eliminated by other means, the authors suggest
that considerations of the future role of 22(d) (whether in the context of an attempt
to repeal or simply an application for exemption) should reflect this historical per-
spective.
Since the passage of the Investment Company Act of 1940
("1940 Act"), 1 section 22(d)2 of that Act has been the subject of
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1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970). The 1940 Act provides that an issuer which
comes within any of three categories shall be deemed an "investment company": (1)
any issuer which "is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to
engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities,"
id., § 80a-3(a)(1); (2) any issuer which "is engaged or proposes to engage in the
business of issuing face amount certificates of the installment type, or has been en-
gaged in such business and has any such certificate outstanding," id. § 80a-3(a)(2);
or (3) any issuer which "is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of invest-
ing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to
acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 percentum of the value of
such issuer's total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on a
consolidated basis," id. § 80a-3 (a) (3).
"Investment companies" may be subdivided into, inter alia, two distinct types:
(1) "open-end" companies, commonly referred to as "mutual funds," which stand at
all times ready to redeem their issued stock at net asset value; and (2) "closed-end"
companies, which do not offer this ready redemption feature. See R. JENNiN s & H.
MARSH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEcuRrrms REGULATON 1441-42 (3d ed. 1972).
The basic purpose of the 1940 Act was to protect the "public interest" and "in-
terest of investors" by requiring full and fair disclosure "concerning the character
of [investment company] securities and the circumstances, policies, and financial re-
sponsibility of such companies and their management," 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(1); and
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much comment.3 Whatever its original purpose, that provision has
been applied by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
to impose what amounts to retail price maintenance on the sale of
mutual fund shares. Literally, section 22(d) only requires that
mutual fund shares be sold to the public at "a current public offering
price described in the prospectus,"4 but in general it has been con-
strued to mean that the price must be the same for all investors.
The objectionable features of such retail price maintenance are
found only in the sale of securities issued by "load funds"-that
is, those mutual funds in which the price of the fund's shares is the
net asset value per share of the fund plus a sales charge, or load,
added thereto." Funds which impose a sales load are permitted, pur-
by preventing the operation and management of such companies, and the selection
of their portfolio securities, in the interests of various insiders, affiliated persons, un-
derwriters, brokers, or dealers--"rather than in the interests of all classes of such
companies' security holders." Id. § 80a-1(b) (2).
HEREINAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS
ARTICLE:
SEC, Report on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, pt. I1 (1940)
[hereinafter cited as Investment Trust Study];
HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE SEC ON
THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No.
2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC POLICY STUDY];
Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as S. 1659 Hearings];
Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) [hereinafter cited as 1940 Act House Hearings];
Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) [hereinafter cited as 1940 Act Senate Hearings];
The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAMn LAw. 732 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Mutual Fund Survey].
2. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970).
3. See sources cited note 10 infra; Hodes, Current Developments Under Section
22(d) of the Investment Company Act, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1061 (1972).
4. No registered investment company shall sell any redeemable security is-
sued by it to any person except either to or through a principal underwriter
for distribution or at a current public offering price described in the prospec-
tus, and, if such class of security is being currently offered to the public by
or through an underwriter, no principal underwriter of such security and no
dealer shall sell any such security to any person except a dealer, a principal
underwriter, or the issuer, except at a current public offering price described
in the prospectus. . . . 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970).
5. See id. § 80a-22(a) to -22(c). A "sales load" is defined in § 80a-2(a) (35)
of the Act as
mhe difference between the price of a security to the public and that por-
tion of the proceeds from its sale which is received and invested or held for
investment by the issuer . . . . less any portion of such difference deducted
for trustee's or custodian's fees, insurance premiums, issue taxes, or adminis-
trative expenses or fees which are not properly chargeable to sales or promo-
tional activities ....
While there are "no load" mutual funds, virtually all open-end companies having
a sales force impose a sales load. See Mutual Fund Survey 744, 833, 843. Closed-
[Vol. 1973:975
MUTUAL FUND PRICING
suant to SEC rule 22d-1 under the 1940 Act,' to have a "scale" of
sales loads which decreases as the amount of securities purchased in-
creases;7 but, with certain limited exceptions,8 the same sales load
must be applied to purchases by all investors who purchase an equal
number of shares, so that there is a resulting uniformity in the public
offering price. Thus, even if an investor has decided to purchase
a particular mutual. fund's shares without having been exposed to
any sales effort by any salesman, he must still pay a sales charge
"designed to cover selling efforts that he does not want, does not
need, and does not get."9
Almost all who have written about section 22(d) of the 1940
Act have contended that the reasons behind its enactment were not
articulated at the congressional hearings or in the committee reports,
and that neither of these sources contain any legislative history of
any value. 10 Arguments have raged from all sides as to the propri-
ety of such a retail price maintenance provision,1 ' but there has been
end companies do not impose a sales load on the price of their shares, but the pur-
chaser usually pays a somewhat lower sales fee in the form of a brokerage commis-
sion. Id. at 744.
6. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22d-1 (1972).
7. Rule 22d-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 270.22d-l(a) (1972), authorizes a scale of reduc-
ing sales loads to be computed on any of three bases: the quantity of securities
purchased at any one time; the total quantity of securities purchased during a 13-
month period; or the aggregate quantity of securities previously purchased and then
owned plus the securities being purchased.
8. Reduced sales loads are also permitted under rule 22d-1, supra note 6, for
plans providing for reinvestment of income and capital gains distributions; upon the
sale to certain qualified plans under INT. REv. CODE of 1954, section 401; upon the
sale to registered unit investment trusts; for private offerings in connection with the
organization of the issuer; and upon the sale to "directors, officers or partners of
the investment company, its investment adviser or principal underwriter, or to the
bona fide, full-time employees or sales representatives of any of the foregoing," pro-
vided such purchases are made for investment. Id. § 270.22d-l(b)-(h). A fairly
recent amendment to this portion of the rule limits the latter sales to persons who
spend at least one half of their working time performing certain services for the mutual
fund or its investment adviser. Rule 22d-l(h), id. § 270.22d-l(h) (1972), promul-
gated by SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6347 (Feb. 8, 1971).
9. PUBLIC POLICY STUDY 221.
10. See, e.g., Greene, The Uniform Offering Price of Mutual Fund Shares Under
the Investment Company Act of 1940, 37 U. DET. L.J. 369, 371 (1960); Simpson
& Hodes, The Continuing Controversy Surrounding the Uniform Price Maintenance Pro-
visions of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 44 NOTRE DAME LAw. 718, 719
(1969). The SEC itself has adopted these assertions. See PUBLIC POLICY STUDY 219.
11. For a defense of the continued necessity for the provision, see Simpson &
Hodes, supra note 10, at 731, and Statement of Investment Company Institute, S.
1659 Hearings 320. For countervailing arguments see PUBLIC POLICY STUDY 217.
See also Statement of Professor Irwin Friend, in S. 1659 Hearings 665; Mutual Fund
Survey 838.
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a general acceptance of what, somewhere along the line, have de-
veloped to be standard assertions as to the historical derivation and
"purposes" of section 22(d). briefly, these assertions are as fol-
lows:
(1) That the provision was drafted by the investment company
industry rather than by the SEC and was inserted into the statute at
the industry's request (thus implying that there would be little possibi-
lity for any "legislative history" since the SEC never contemplated
such a provision);
(2) That the objectives of the section were "well known to the
industry and the Commission" and were as follows:
(a) To insure orderly distribution in the marketing of
mutual fund shares.
(b) To prevent discrimination or preferential treatment
in price among buyers.
(c) To prevent sales of mutual fund shares via "third
markets" or "bootleg markets" established by dealers who had not
contracted with the issuing investment company for the sale of its shares
(non-contract dealers).1
In this article, we intend to develop a second (or first) look at
section 22(d) as an integral part of the overall scheme of section 22
of the 1940 Act. We believe there is some question as to the con-
tinued validity of the above assertions in view of what the legis-
lative history of the 1940 Act actually discloses as to the background
and purpose of section 22(d). That history, as will be discussed
below, reveals that the requirement of a uniform sales load was a
compromise provision designed primarily as a device to curb abuses
resulting in dilution of the value of mutual fund shares and, possibly,
to impose some limitations on the activities of "non-contract" dealers. 8
Only incidentally, and as a natural consequence of its operation, did
the section entail the "price-fixing" aspects which are now assumed
by many to be its raison d'etre.
12. See Greene, supra note 10, at 372. The "bootleg market" was a pre-1940
Act market maintained by non-contract dealers who did not have to give up any
portion of the sales load to the principal underwriter and, therefore, could ask less
than the normal sales price and still get a greater profit spread than the authorized
dealer.
13. The extent to which section 22(d) in fact was intended to control the activi-
ties of selling brokers and dealers is presently being litigated in several antitrust suits.
(See note 129 infra and accompanying text.) While some writers have at least im-
plied that the written record may not completely reflect the intent of Congress, this
Article will focus almost exclusively on the Investment Trust Study and the Senate
and House hearings.
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Renewed scrutiny of the circumstances which actually generated
the passage of section 22(d) seems especially appropriate in view of
the current controversy regarding the desirability of continuing the
retail price maintenance structure which has resulted from that sec-
tion's enactment. 14 Our purpose, therefore, is to examine whether,
in light of subsequent developments, section 22(d), as presently con-
strued and applied, continues to be necessary to curb the specific
abuses to which it was initially addressed.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 22 (d)
Investment Trust Study
The Report on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies'15
was prepared by the SEC pursuant to the direction of section 30
of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.16 In Volume
Three of that Report, the SEC discussed in some detail the abuses
then prevalent in the mutual fund trading practices of distributors,
dealers and, to some extent, investment company insiders.- 7  Three
principal types of abuses, collectively characterized as "trading against
the fund," were noted, all of which stemmed from the operation of
what has been referred to as the "two-price" system.'
To appreciate the development of these specific pricing and sales
practices, some understanding of the operation of the "two-price"
system is necessary.'" The "two-price" system can only prevail where
there is "backward pricing;" that is, where the price of the mutual
fund shares is based on previously determined values of the under-
lying assets. When such a pricing structure existed, the investment
company's portfolio was normally valued daily at the close of trading
on the New York Stock Exchange. However, the net asset value
14. See text accompanying notes 72-130 infra. In the 91st Congress Senator
McIntyre introduced a bill, S. 296, which provided for the complete repeal of section
22(d). S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(a) (1969). However, the Investment Com-
pany Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 83 Stat. 1413, as passed, made
only certain technical amendments to section 22(d) leaving the substantive retail price
maintenance portion untouched.
15. Investment Trust Study.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 79z-4 (1970).
17. Investment Trust Study 855-75. References to "insiders" include officials and
employees of the investment company, its investment adviser and its principal under-
writer, and affiliates thereof, and any other persons who could be considered to be
in the role of an "insider" as to an investment company. The significant characteristic
for our purposes is that these people in many cases were able to buy shares of a
"load" fund without paying the standard sales commission.
18. Id.
19. For a shorthand example of this system see Mutual Fund Survey 790-92.
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price for the fund's shares based on that day's valuation did not go
into effect until the opening of the Exchange the following morning.
In the interim period (i.e., between the close of the New York Stock
Exchange on one day and the opening of the Exchange the next
day), two prices could be ascertained-the present trading day's
price, which was computed on the preceding day's asset values and
which was still in effect, and the price for the next trading day
which had been computed on the present day's asset values but which
had not as yet gone into effect. Thus, if an investment company's
net asset value as of the close of the Exchange on a given trading
day had increased over its net asset value at the close of the Ex-
change on the preceding day, a purchaser could buy into the fund at
a price which was lower than the current net asset value-because
the price based on that value had not yet gone into effect.20 For
example, suppose ABC Fund values its portfolio on December 1 at
the close of business of the New York Stock Exchange (4 p.m.) and
this results in a valuation of $11 per share net asset value. That
is the price of the shares all during the day of December 2, even
if the value of the portfolio for ABC has substantially increased dur-
ing the day. At 4 p.m., the portfolio is valued and the per-share
net asset value is now $11.20 (which is an exaggeration for the pur-
pose of illustration since such a substantial increase is unlikely to
occur in one day's trading in a mutual fund of any size). At this
point, two prices are in effect: (1) $11 per share for which the
shares may be bought; and (2) $11.20 per share for which the
shares bought at $11 can be sold on December 3, the next day. The
vulnerability of such a system to value-diluting in-and-out trans-
actions is readily apparent.21
A form of backward pricing continued to exist in the industry
until 1968, when the SEC adopted rule 22c-1.22 That rule required
20. For the average investor, who was required to purchase shares at the full
sales load, it would not normally be profitable to buy and sell immediately in
a rising market, since the one-day increase would usually be too small to offset the
load he would have to pay on the purchase. However, insiders, who were not required
to pay the full load (or any at all) and who were aware of the two prices, could
buy at the lower price, hold for one day, and then redeem the shares at the higher
price the next day. See 1940 Act Senate Hearings 142, 842. In addition to using
the investing technique noted above, dealers could profit through this two-price system
by acquiring shares at the lower of the two known prices with a view to using shares
the next day to fill orders at the higher price. Thus, the dealer would retain the
balance between the two prices, in addition to the increased sales load on the next
day's higher price. See id. at 144-45.
21. See text accompanying note 31 infra.
22. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (1972):
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all open-end investment companies to value their shares for purchases
and redemptions at the next daily computed net asset value of the
fund after receipt of an order to purchase or after the tender of a
security for redemption. This form of pricing is known as "forward
pricing" or "fixed pricing" and, as pointed out below, had it been
adopted at the time of enactment of the 1940 Act, the principal
abuses which section 22(d) was designed to curb would have been
eliminated and that provision itself would probably not have been
enacted, or, if enacted, would have been addressed more specifically
to the problems generated by the activities of "non-contract' dealers.
The following three principal abuses were focused on in the
Investment Trust Study:
(1) Riskless Trading Profits for the Dealer:
A number of factors operated to provide riskless trading profits
for the dealer. In many cases, contract dealers (dealers authorized
to sell investment company shares by contract with the principal
underwriter) inventoried stock of the investment company, acting as
principal both in the purchase and sale of such stock-in effect
establishing a "secondary" market. If the dealer was long in a
stock23 at a price equal to (or below) current net asset value, upon
sale of the stock, he retained the full load paid by the investor (as
well as any increase in the price paid by the investor over the price
of the stock in the dealer's inventory), since the dealer did not have
to call upon the distributor to furnish the stock. Thus, because he
could ride with a decline in the stock's price until it had offset the
amount of the load he could charge when he sold, the dealer was in
the uniquely advantageous position of being able to hedge with in-
ventory on a rise in the fund stock's price (with the help of the
backward pricing system) while exposing himself to virtually no
(a) No registered investment company issuing any redeemable security,
no person designated in such issuer's prospectus as authorized to consummate
transactions in any such security, and no principal underwriter of, or dealer
in, any such security shall sell, redeem, or repurchase any such security ex-
cept at a price based on the current net asset value of such security which is
next computed after receipt of a tender of such security for redemptions or of
an order to purchase or sell such security.
(b) For the purposes of this section, the current net asset value of any
such security shall be that computed on each day during which the New York
Stock Exchange is open for the trading, not less frequently than once daily
as of the time of the close of trading on such Exchange.
23. A dealer who takes a long position buys or contracts to buy a supply of that
stock exceeding the amount of the stock for which he has received orders or contracted
to deliver, speculating on a significant future advance in the market. BLACK'S LAW
DicI-oNARY 1092 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
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risk of loss. Only when, due to the absence of buy orders, he was
forced to turn in his inventory to the distributor for redemption or
resale at a reduced current asset value would the dealer suffer any
loss.
In some circumstances, as where the dealer had purchased the
securities of the fund from retiring shareholders at the low bid
price,24 a dealer could make a profit from his long position even in
a declining market by timely liquidation with the distributor. Accord-
ing to the Investment Trust Study, this stemmed from a combination
of three factors: First, the distributors' maintenance of an independ-
ent market (thus enabling them to repurchase from the dealer at
current price) ;25 second, the fact that the dealer was not required to
pay a load (or premium) above the net asset value for the purchase of
the shares; and third, the fact that the dealer knew in advance the
next day's price.26  Thus, in anticipation of a rising market, a dealer
might purchase the securities of the fund from a retiring shareholder
at the distributor's bid price. If no buy orders materialized after sev-
eral days of a rising market, and if a decline in asset value then ocur-
red (which he would know because of the two-price system), the
dealer could liquidate his position with the distributor before the re-
duction in value affected the price he could get. Profits, of course,
were much greater in a constantly rising market. As the Investment
Trust Study points out, the public investor was not in a position to
obtain similar benefits because, in order to purchase, "he had to pay
a premium (or load) over asset or liquidation value, a premium
which was lost upon redemption." 27
(2) Virtually Riskless Trading Profits for the Principal Distribu-
tor:
The; principal distributor (principal underwriter),28 if permitted
by his contract to act as principal in the purchase and sale of shares,
often obtained the same riskless trading advantages mentioned above
which were available to the dealer, with one exception. In a declin-
24. The bid price represented what the distributor would pay on redemption. In-
vestment Trust Study 861 n.323.
25. See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
26. Investment Trust Study 862.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 864. A "principal underwriter" is defined in section 2(a)(29) of the
1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(29,) (1970). When he acts as principal, he buys mutual
fund shares from the fund itself, at no-load, for the purpose of filling dealers' orders
for the fund shares daily. He usually maintains a "repurchase" market for the fund
shares to afford shareholders and dealers immediate redemption of their shares.
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ing market, the distributor could not obviate the risk of loss on shares
purchased in anticipation of buy orders by merely obtaining the re-
demption of those shares, unless the investment company redeemed
on the basis of the current day's market close. Most companies, how-
ever, offered shares on the basis of the previous day's close and
redeemed shares on the basis of the following day's close.
Thus, while a contract dealer could cover a potential loss in a
declining market by obtaining immediate liquidation from the distribu-
tor at the current net asset value of the fund (the current bid price
maintained by the distributor), the distributor normally had to wait
24 hours for determination of the investment company's redemption
price. However, as stated in the Investment Trust Study, "on a rising
market and with no load to overcome, the risk taken by the distribu-
tor would be minimized. Furthermore, if the investment company
redeemed on the basis of the current day's market close, the risk was
eliminated."2 9
(3) The So-Called "Bootleg" Market:
This market, mentioned briefly in the Investment Trust Study,
was made by dealers who traded in mutual fund shares without
the authority of the principal underwriter and therefore without the
necessity of surrendering any portion of the sales load. As ex-
plained in the Study:
These dealers would often offer a little more than the published
redemption price and ask a little less than the published sale price.
In an active market, the unauthorized dealer could still get a greater
spread than the authorized dealer. . . . Such operations actually
had the effect of initiating a small scale price war between retailers
and tended generally to disrupt the established offering price. 30
The main emphasis of the Study, however, was on the asset-
diluting problems engendered by riskless, or virtually riskless, trad-
ing around the backward pricing system rather than on the potential
for retail price war among dealers. The dilution referred to resulted
from the reduction in value of existing shareholders' pro-rata interest
in the fund arising as a natural consequence of backward pricing
29. Investment Trust Study at 864.
30. Id. at 865 (citation omitted). This "bootleg" market among non-contract deal-
ers should be distinguished from the secondary market established and maintained by
contract dealers, which was apparently a much stronger and much more active market.
Id. at 809, 857. As to this latter market, the principal abuse commented upon
in the Study was not the disruption of the offering price, but rather the riskless profit
which could be obtained by such dealers as a result of the two-price system.
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in a rising market. For example, if yesterday there were 10 shares
outstanding and $100 in the fund, and today the fund is worth $110,
one who purchases today under the backward pricing system would
pay $10 per share rather than $11 (which represents the existing
shareholders' pro-rata interest in the $110 fund). Thus, the $10
increase in the fund's value will be diluted to the extent that today's
purchaser is permitted to share in that increase by buying at yester-
day's price. It was noted in the Study that the incoming shareholder,
as well as the distributor and dealer, could benefit from the "price
lag" caused by this system.3' In addition, dealer and insider pur-
chases, which took advantage of the two-price system and the opera-
tion of the purchase and redemption structure in general through
"riskless trading" or "trading against the trust," increased the share-
holders' dilution loss and resulted in unwarranted profits. 82  There
was no mention in the Study, however, of any problems of price
"discrimination" resulting from variations in the sales load imposed
on the purchase of shares by different members of the general invest-
ing public.
Congressional Action
The text of the congressional hearings on the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 amounts to some 1,300 pages. The SEC presented
the findings of its study at the initial hearings before a Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency.3 3  It then gave
its recommendations, which had been embodied in proposed bill S.
3580.11 At the conclusion of the Commission's testimony, the in-
dustry spokesmen stated their positions-in general agreeing with the
31. Id. at 865-66: "Although the informed incoming stockholder could benefit
from the operation of the two-price system because he could buy in a rising market
at the lower of two prices, the existing stockholder nevertheless sustained a diminution
of the asset value of his shares." But see text accompanying note 27 supra.
32. "[O]fficers and directors could buy shares for cash without any premium,
and hence were able to take a trading position in a fund they were managing." Id.
at 871. It should be noted that the sanctions against insider trading contained in
section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970), have never been
made applicable to officers, directors, and 10% beneficial owners in open-end invest-
ment companies. See note 71 infra and accompanying text.
33. 1940 Act Senate Hearings 135-59, 288.
34. 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). S. 3580, the original bill proposed by the SEC,
did not embody section 22(d) or anything closely resembling it. The need for such
a provision became apparent during the hearings on S. 3580 and was explicitly pro-
vided for in the memorandum of agreement between the SEC and the representatives
of the industry which developed from these hearings and which constituted the basic
framework of the bill as ultimately structured. 1940 Act House Hearings 96-100.
See notes 69-70 infra and accompanying text. See also Greene, supra note 10, at 371.
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need for regulation, but opposing certain portions of the bill. 5 The
industry and the SEC then prepared a joint memorandum of agree-
ment on all of the contested provisions of the bill, in which they in-
cluded a new section 22.36 Later, a joint effort was made to present
the bill reflecting the compromise between the industry and the SEC.
Mr. Baldwin Bane, then Director of the SEC Registration Divi-
sion, and Mr. Mahlon E. Traylor, then President of Massachusetts
Distributors, Inc., were the spokesmen for the SEC and the industry,
respectively, on the question of regulation of selling practices-those
provisions ultimately adopted in sections 22 and 23 of the 1940 Act
for "open-end" and "closed-end" investment companies. Building
upon the emphasis supplied by the Investment Trust Study, the testi-
mony of these two individuals stressed the abuses of the distribution
and pricing system which resulted in the "dilution" of shareholder
interest and riskless profits to the distributors, dealers, and insiders.
According to their testimony, the "two-price" system had fostered
the exploitative buying and selling practices which gave rise to the
pressure for regulation in this area.37
With these abuses in mind, the SEC's bill, as introduced by Sen-
ator Wagner, provided in section 22(a) for regulation of the "invest-
ment company" as well as the "principal underwriter" by requiring
both to sell, redeem, and repurchase the investment company's se-
curities at a price bearing a particular relation to the current asset value
of that security, computed as of such time as the Commission should
prescribe. 38  Section 22(b), as originally proposed, addressed one
aspect of the riskless trading mentioned above, and would have pre-
cluded underwriters and dealers, in connection with a primary dis-
tribution, from purchasing a security from the issuer or from any
underwriter except at the price at which such purchasing underwriter
or dealer in turn sold the security less an appropriate comMission.9
Finally, in section 22(c) of the original bill as introduced, the SEC
35. 1940 Act Senate Hearings 325.
36. 1940 Act House Hearings 99.
37. Thus, in a rising market, when the rise results in an asset increase of the
share that is greater than the load that is added to cover sales commissions
and profits, a person can buy a security, after the two prices are known and
established, at the lower of the two prices and almost immediately turn in the
share for redemption for a higher price without any chance or risk of loss; he
can't lose. . . . We found in our study for September that some insiders-
that is officers of the sponsors, managers and underwriters-took advantage
of the two price system to buy shares before the advance price went into op-
eration and then almost immediately redeemed them at the higher known
price. 1940 Act Senate Hearings 141-42.
38. S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 22(a) (1940).
39. Id. § 22(b).
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was given the power to keep investment companies from selling
their securitites at unconscionable or grossly excessive sales loads.40
Specific considerations were provided for determining whether a sales
load was unconscionable or grossly excessive.41
Nothing approaching the present section 22(d) was contained in
S. 3580 as introduced. However, one should note that, as introduced,
this bill would have given the Commission the power to eliminate
effectively the principal abuses of the distribution system, since the
bill gave the SEC the power to eliminate the "price lag" caused by
the two-price, backward-pricing system.4" The approach in the origi-
nal bill, unlike the approach in the bill as finally adopted, would not
have permitted industry self-regulation. Testimony in the legislative
hearings, however, shows that the SEC was willing to present a bill
which would meet the industry's desires in terms of industry self-
regulation.43
David Schenker, Chief Counsel for the Investment Trust Study,
presented S. 3580 to the Senate Banking and Currency Committee
and discussed each of its provisions. In his discussion of section 22,
he stated that it dealt with the problem of dilution of shareholders'
interest in open-end companies.44 He further stated that:
[I]f the industry has any difficulty with giving the Commission pow-
er to formulate rules and regulations, then the Commission is pre-
pared to recommend to the committee a specific provision which in
its opinion will meet that situation.
We talked to the industry; we had the feeling, although our plan
to meet that situation is at least theoretically perfect, they say it
may have some undesirable consequences iA connection with their
40. Id. § 22(c).
41. Id. The bill provided as follows:
In determining whether a sales load is unconscionable or grossly excessive,
due weight shall be given to the incidents, denominations, and selling price of
the securities involved, to the organization, investment policy, past and pro-
spective earnings, management expenses, and management and sales methods
of the issuer, its managers, depositors, underwriters, and dealers and its and
their competitors, and to such other factors as are relevant in the particular
proceeding.
42. The actual pricing system to be established under section 22(a) was not
set out. However, by regulating the investment company itself, not just the dealer,
some system, such as forward pricing, could be devised to curtail all dilution. To
provide against "riskless trading" and "position-taking" by dealers, section 22(b) of
that bill contained purchase requirements on the underwriter and distributor. In point
of fact, as discussed below, the SEC apparently intended to adopt "forward pricing."
43. See text accompanying note 45 infra.
44. Mr. Schenker stated: "Section 22 deals with the problem which Mr. Bane
discussed in detail-that is, the possible dilution of the equity of certificate holders
in open-end companies." 1940 Act Senate Hearings 288.
[Vol. 1973:975
MUTUAL FUND PRICING
distribution activities. 45
Mr. Schenker then referred to Mr. Bane's earlier testimony on
industry abuses as a detailed discussion of the subject which section
22 was designed to cover.46  Significantly, there is nothing in Mr.
Bane's testimony relating to "price discrimination" (i.e., selling iden-
tical securities to competing purchasers at different prices),47 orderly
distribution, or "bootlegging" operations.48  To the contrary, Mr.
Bane's testimony is almost exclusively taken up with riskless trading
and dilution caused by the two-price system.
Mr. Traylor spoke for the industry in response to the testimony
of Mr. Bane and Mr. Schenker. 49  During his testimony, Mr. Tray-
lor stated that at first the industry had agreed to the granting of dis-
cretionary power to the SEC to govern the pricing system, but, upon
hearing the testimony of Messrs. Bane and Schenker, the industry
group decided that the Commission had settled upon a method of
regulating pricing and selling which they believed to be "wholly im-
practical." 50  It appears that the industry believed the Commission
would eliminate the two-price backward pricing system and move to
a forward pricing system.51 The industry was wholly opposed to the
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. It is important to distinguish between (1) the effective price advantage secured
by distributors, dealers, and some "insiders" as a result of the pricing system formerly
in effect and (2) disparities in the actual prices charged to competing members of
the purchasing public, which constitutes "price discrimination" in the generally ac-
cepted sense. Although it was the former practice which generated the passage of
section 22(d), the section's current function is almost wholly limited to barring the
latter.
48. 1940 Act Senate Hearings 135-59, 835-63.
49. Id. at 514.
50. Mr. Traylor stated:
Mr. Schenker had said, because of various problems involved, it seemed de-
sirable early in the consideration of this matter to vest such discretionary
power in the S.E.C. rather than attempt to write an inflexible provision into
the law. We were generally agreeable to this act at the time, because we felt
that the S.E.C. would adopt a practical attitude toward the matter and that
between the industry and the S.E.C. a practical solution to the problems would
be found.
Since then, however, the testimony of both Mr. Bane, of the Registration
Division, and of Mr. Schenker leaves no doubt in our minds that they have
already decided upon a method of pricing and selling shares which we believe
to be wholly impractical. Id. at 515.
51. Mr. Traylor testified:
As I mentioned earlier in this statement, the S.E.C. testimony convinces
many of us that they have already decided upon a theory of pricing and sell-
ing shares which, we are convinced, would seriously cripple the whole indus-
try. This theory contemplates that shares be sold only on the basis of a
price to be determined as at the close of the stock exchange on the day on
which purchase orders are executed. Adoption of this theory of selling
shares would, in my opinion, be unsound, impractical, and unfair. Id. at 523
(emphasis added).
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prospect of forward pricing which could have been (and probably
would have been) established by the SEC pursuant to section 22(a)
as originally drafted.52
As to the automatic dilution caused by the normal operation
of the two-price system in a rising market, Mr. Traylor pointed out
that the loading charge was a deterrent to the average investor's ability
to take advantage of the system by moving in and out. He stated:
Incidentally, and I do not think the S.E.C. made this point clear
enough in its testimony, the fact that an investor has to pay an under-
writing commission or so-called loading charge virtually eliminates
even the opportunity in our type of company to buy at one known
price and immediately resell at the next higher known price. That
is, in buying, the investor pays the asked price, which includes the
loading charge of around 7-1 percent on the average, and in sell-
ing he receives the bid price, which is the asset value of the sharesY3
This, of course, was true with respect to average investors, but not
necessarily true with respect to insiders and dealers.
Mr. Traylor discussed at length the necessity for a "firm" price
in the business.54 He suggested that the dilution problem could be
solved by establishing a set of rules or regulations, or "some code of
fair practice."5 5 In response to a specific question by Senator Wagner
on "in-and-out" purchasing, Mr. Traylor remarked that "one of the
abuses that occurred was when an insider, so-called, a director or
trustee, in a few instances did not have to pay the asked price," and
then turned the shares back in the next day.56 In an effort to show
that the problem was not unsolvable, Mr. Traylor pointed out that
under the (then) Blue Sky Law of Ohio, there was a provision which
made it necessary for insiders to pay the full asked price and that be-
cause of this, the particular dilution abuse would be cured. 57  The
"asked price" Mr. Traylor referred to obviously meant the public
offering price, including the sales load, as opposed to just the net
52. Id. Thus under a forward pricing system, no one, irrespective of whether
or not a load was paid, would be able to cause dilution because everyone would pay
the net asset value as computed after the order to purchase was received, and they
would pay their pro-rata share of that current value in all cases. Furthermore, there
would be no opportunity for riskless trading by anyone under such a pricing system.
53. Id. at 522.
54. Mr. Traylor commented that the lack of a "firm price" in the industry would
force an increase in selling commissions. His premise was that without a firm price,
an incoming shareholder would not be able to purchase the shares at the value during
the time he placed the order. Id. at 523-24.
55. Id. at 525.
56. Id. at 526.
57. Id.
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asset value. In other words, insiders would be kept from moving
in and out of the trusts by imposing a load on them, similar to that
which was imposed on ordinary investors-thus, largely eliminating
the advantage to such rapid trading. Finally, Mr. Traylor made the
following comment:
I might say, further, that I use Ohio as an example. But this
matter of insider trading the industry wants to cure. It should not
have existed; it should not be allowed to exist, and it has been
cured insofar as 80 percent of the industry is concerned, by this
Ohio regulation, which is a step in the right direction.58
Other industry spokesmen continued the attack on the SEC ver-
sion of the bill giving it power to regulate pricing and selling prac-
tices in the industry. Mr. Warren Motley, counsel for Massachusetts
Investors Trust, was questioned by Senator Wagner about the prob-
lems of dilution. The following exchange took place:
Senator Wagner- . . . It is alleged, and I am entirely dependent
upon the testimony, that insiders know that that price tomorrow
morning is going to be higher, because they have watched prices go
up, I mean prices of different securities that are held. They have
that information, and toward the end of the day they buy in a con-
siderable number of shares and therefore have a sure-thing propo-
sition, and they make a so-called insider's profit. Now, if that is
possible is there some way by which we can prevent that sort of
thing by the inside trader? It does dilute the assets, and to that
extent I think it is an injustice to the present shareholders.
Mr. Motley-Senator Wagner, it has been brought out that the out-
sider, who has to pay a load or selling commission on top of liquid-
ating value, has no incentive or possibility of doing that because the
rise in the market in a day would never be nearly enough to let him
out with his load.59
Mr. Motley went on to explain the industry's case for overcoming
abuses of dilution and for new, self-regulating provisions in section
22 by again referring to the Ohio regulation requiring a load to be
imposed on all sales.00
58. Id. at 526-27.
59. Id. at 660.
60. Mr. Motley continued:
As far as insiders are concerned, the state regulation which has been
spoken of as Q3 to which at least 80 percent of the open-end trusts are now
subject, now forbids selling shares to anyone except the general distributors
and dealers at a price less than the price to the general public. That is why
I brought out this point, that the general public cannot take advantage of the
situation which you have mentioned. Under the regulation, which I think is
a good one, it is forbidden to give a lower price to anyone inside the com-
pany. The distributor of course, buys at the flat liquidating value, because he
has got to put on the load to pay his expenses and make his profit. The
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Thus appears the real beginning of what became section 22,
including the foundation and rationale for a provision such as section
22(d), which would require a sales load to be imposed on all sales.
The sales load requirement was imposed primarily as a deterrent to
the value-diluting in-out transactions and "riskless trading" encour-
aged by the backward-pricing system. The "price-fixing" conse-
quences entailed by the enactment were the mere by-products of the
essential scheme. In the above quotation, Mr. Motley presented the
case for charging a full load to all persons buying from the fund.
This would eliminate, with the exception of principal underwriters
and dealers who could be regulated by the industry themselves under
the Maloney Act,61 any possible dilution abuses. Note, however, that
there was absolutely no issue as to price discrimination in the sense
that one individual is favored over another because he can obtain
something at a lower price. Because the industry did not want to
allow the SEC to change the pricing system, i.e., go to a forward
pricing system, it advocated an approach to the dilution problem (as
ultimately adopted in section 22) which would permit the industry
to use self-regulatory procedures to prevent the dilution abuses, and
it suggested that a provision imposing the load upon all people would
eliminate insider trading. Again, there is no discussion in any of this
regarding distribution of mutual fund shares to the public (except
insofar as originally proposed sections 22(a) and (b) would apply)
or bootleg operations or price discrimination.
In later testimony before the Senate, the SEC, through Mr. Bane,
further emphasized the problems of dilution caused by the normal
operation of the backward pricing system in conjunction with the
dealer to whom the distributor sells in turn pays a price somewhere between
the price which the distributor pays and the price which the public pays.
There is the theoretical, perhaps actual, possibility of the distributor or
the dealer taking advantage of the situation which you point out. In well
regulated trusts the distributor is forbidden by his contract to do that. He
agrees to use his best efforts to prevent any dealer from doing it. That is the
situation, however, which we all recognize and which, as Mr. Traylor sug-
gested, we feel could best be regulated under the Maloney Act by reason
of the fact that it is a situation which can only be availed of by distributors
and dealers, all of whom are necessarily members of the association created
under the Maloney Act. Id. at 661.
61. The Maloney Act, Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 677, § 1, 52 Stat. 1070, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1970), added § 15(A) of the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act, which provides for self-regulation through registered associations. The NASD
is the only association that has ever registered. Mr. Motley did not mention price
discrimination in the sense that one individual is favored over another because, by
shopping with different brokers, he can obtain a lower sales load, and therefore a
better price. The industry representatives maintained that their own self-policing tech-
niques had already accomplished the result intended, i.e., keeping insiders and others
from "riskless trading" which resulted in dilution,
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load exemptions or discounts enjoyed by some dealers and insiders:62
In most of these trusts, the insider and dealer does not have to
pay the full load, but buys at a figure close to net asset value.
Large purchasers often have the same advantage. If the market ap-
preciation is in excess of the charge to such persons, they have a
trading advantage not available to the general public who bear the
full load .6
Mr. Bane then introduced a letter from the vic6 president of
Massachusetts Distributors addressed to the SEC. The letter had
been written, after Messrs. Traylor and Motley gave their original
testimony, in reponse to a request by Mr. Bane for "suggestions with
regard to rules and regulations which the Securities and Exchange
Commission might draw up to govern the pricing and sale of shares
of open-end investment funds."'64 The letter stated that there were
two separate points to be considered in working out a solution to
the problem:
(1) The setting up of safeguards through the funds and the
distributors to prevent any abuse, such as "riskless trading," of what-
ever pricing system it adopted as standard practice; and
(2) The effective reduction of so-called "dilution" to a practical
minimum.
To control "in-and-out" trading by dealers and insiders, the
letter suggested that holding periods be imposed on all sales of
shares to such parties.65  The requirement that a full load be imposed
on all purchasers, including insiders, was rejected because, according
to the letter, "forcing 'insiders' to pay sales costs when no such costs
are involved does not strike us as sound business practice." 66
Interestingly, section 30(d) of the Act as proposed in S. 3580
would have imposed a holding period on all officers, directors, or
ten percent beneficial owners of open-end and closed-end investment
company shares, because it provided that the requirements of section
16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were to apply to all in-
62. Mr. Bane, recapping his earlier testimony, stated:
I explained that the two-price system was used by practically all open-
end companies now selling and how, with the redemption provisions, in many
instances, it resulted in providing one understanding the system, which few
people do, a means for absolutely riskless trading to the detriment and further
dilution of the trust and that some dealers and some insiders take advantage
of it. 1940 Act Senate Hearings 841.
63. Id. at 842.
64. Id. at 858.
65. Id. at 859.
66. Id.
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vestment companies.17  As indicated in the above letter, this im-
position of a holding period would have eliminated the "in-and-out"
trading advantages available to insiders. Instead, the industry appar-
ently persuaded the SEC that the imposition of a uniform sales load
would be a more appropriate solution to the problem of insider abuse
than the application of section 16(b) to the open-end companies. 8
Just prior to the conclusion of the hearings, Mr. Arthur Bunker,
as a representative of the industry, appeared before the Senate Com-
mittee to present the industry's position on changes in the bill. One
of the points made by Mr. Bunker was as follows:
19. Distribution, redemption and repurchase of redeemable se-
curities, section 22 of the present bill: These sections have to do pri-
marily with problems of dilution and excessive sales loads. As these
are problems affecting distribution and transactions with dealers, all of
whom are members of a securities association organized and regulated
under the Maloney Act, this section should provide that the rules of
such securities association may deal with this subject matter. This sec-
tion should also provide that no securities issued by an investment com-
pany shall be sold to insiders or to anyone other than an underwriter
or dealer except on the same terms as are offered to other investors.
Appropriate provisions may be made for mergers. 69
This same language was incorporated into the memorandum of agree-
ment between the SEC and the industry.7 9 In referring to the "same
terms," the industry was probably rejecting the position set forth in
the letter from the vice president of Massachusetts Distributors, which
advocated continued load exemption for insiders. It appears that
they had opted to choose the "Ohio" approach and impose a full
load on everyone. This theory is supported by the recommendation
in the memorandum of agreement as to section 30, to wit, that the
"short-swing profit" provisions of section 16 of the Securities and
Exchange Act be applied only to closed-end companies.71  Apparent-
67. S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 30(d) (1940):
(d) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of
more than 10 per centum of any class of outstanding securities (other than
short-term paper) of which a registered investment company is the issuer, or
who is a director or an officer of such a company, shall be subject to the
same duties and liabilities as those imposed upon certain beneficial owners,
directors and officers by section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act makes recoverable by an issuer to which
the provision is applicable any profits obtained by officers, directors or ten percent
beneficial owners as a result of any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of the
issuing equity securities within any period of six months. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
68. See note 71 infra and accompanying text.
69. 1940 Act Senate Hearings 1057 (emphasis added).
70. 1940 Act House Hearings 99.
71. The Note at the end of the Memorandum of Agreement states as follows:
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ly, it was decided that the imposition of a sales load on the purchase
price for open-end company insiders would be a sufficient deterrent
in itself.
The necessity for a provision such as section 22(d), in the con-
text of the dilution abuses which led to the adoption of section 22
itself, arises because of the following: sections 22(a) and (b) pro-
vided for self-regulation of distributors, dealers and salesmen, includ-
ing the imposition of holding periods as to them and the regulution
of their pricing methods; and section 22(c) provided for SEC rule-
making power to supplement section 22(a). Such regulation would
not necessarily cover other insiders of open-end companies; section 30
was amended to apply the duties and liabilities imposed under section
16(b) of the Exchange Act only to officers, directors and 10 percent
beneficial owners of closed-end companies; therefore, section 22(d)
was necessary to place some form of trading restraint on load fund
insiders which would nullify the riskless trading advantage they had
enjoyed under the backward pricing system. That advantage resulted
from the insider's ability to purchase at net asset value and redeem
the following day or two days later at a higher price, which the
pricing system had allowed him to foresee at the time he made his
purchase. To eliminate this form of "discrimination," the Act pro-
vided for a full load to be imposed on everyone, including insiders.
The Act could as well have provided, as was recommended by
some and as was embodied in the original section 30, for a specific hold-
ing period-such as the six-month period imposed by section 16(b) of
the Exchange Act--or other such safeguards to insure that pur-
chases were made for investment. Moreover, the Act could have re-
quired that a method of forward pricing be established. Instead, a
form of retail price maintenance was imposed, the initial justification
for which has long since ceased to exist. In view of the complicated
language ultimately accepted to accomplish the foregoing purpose, it
may be assumed that the industry and the SEC may have concluded
that it would be desirable to eliminate problems with "non-contract"
dealers through this provision, but there is no clear indication on the
public record that this was intended.
In addition provision is to be made applying to closed-end companies
Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 in respect of the lia-
bility of directors, etc., for profits made within six months on the purchase
and sale of the corporation's securities. Id.
The recommendation was followed and section 30 was amended to make only
closed-end companies subject to the restrictions of section 16(b). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
29(f).
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY-AS LATER INTERPRETED
Both the SEC and the industry have assisted in the perversion
of the legislative history of section 22(d). The Commission's Gen-
eral Counsel, on March 13, 1941, stated that "At least one of the
purposes of the requirement of disclosure of the 'current offering
price' is to prevent . . . discrimination. '7 2 The discrimination to
which he was referring concerned a fact situation where it was proposed
that the principal underwriter have the option of reducing the sales
load for purchases in excess of $25,000. Given the "purpose" of
section 22(d), it is understandable that the General Counsel would
not favor placing this option in the hands of the principal under-
writer, since he could use it to permit insiders to purchase at no-load
and continue to obtain riskless trading profits. However, the Gen-
eral Counsel did agree that, under section 22(d), varying sales loads
could be charged based on the quantity purchased, so long as
these charges were uniformly applied to all investors. Such a position
would appear contrary to the legislative purpose of section 22(d),
since investors, including insiders, could purchase large quantities of
mutual fund shares at a much lower load, if the prospectus so pro-
vided, resulting in the same dilution abuses and "in-and-out" trading
advantages which had earlier been achieved by insiders.
By this time, however, the industry itself had already changed
its practices so that most funds were precluding insiders from pur-
chasing, except for investment.73 Also, less than a month after the
statements of the General Counsel referred to above, the SEC ap-
proved a proposed revision to the NASD Rules of Fair Practice which
provided for twice-daily pricing.74 By pricing twice daily, the "price
72. SEC Inv. Co. Act Release No. 89 (March 13, 1941), noted at, 17 C.F.R. pt.
271 (1971). There was A form of "discrimination," as pointed out above, in favor
of insiders, but it resulted from the ability of insiders to take advantage of the "back-
ward-pricing" system to achieve riskless profits rather than from a policy of classical
"price discrimination" on the part of dealers or underwriters. The General Counsel's
argument carried to an extreme would simply mean that if insider purchases were
disclosed in the prospectus as being at no-load, this would satisfy the requirements
of Section 22(d).
73. At the time of the passage of the Act, a number of funds had already gone
to such a method of governing sales of fund shares to insiders. 1940 Act Senate
Hearings 855-56.
74. Proposed Amendment to the Rules of Fair Practice of the NASD, Inc., 9
SEC 38 (1941). Article m, section 26(e) of the NASD, RULES oF FAIR PRerncn
(Aug. 1967, Reprint of the Manual), required that two prices be established. The
portfolio was to be valued at the close of business of the NYSE, and this price would
be in effect until 1:00 p.m. of the following business day. The portfolio was to be
valued again at 12:00 noon the following day, and the price from this valuation would
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lag" was reduced, thereby reducing the degree of dilution. Reducing the
price lag resulted in shares being purchased at a value more nearly the
actual value of the portfolio at the time of purchase, and, except in
unusual market situations, the price differential between the offering
net asset value and the actual net asset value would be small. The
emasculation of the two-price system by twice daily pricing, the control
of dealers and distributors under sections 22(a) and (b),71 and the
industry's self-imposed requirement that purchases of mutual fund
shares by insiders be made for investment only"0 virtually eliminated
the problems at which section 22(d) was aimed. Therefore, while
the prevention of price discrimination between purchasers (in the
typical sense of retail price maintenance) is not reflected in the written
record as a reason or justification for the existence of section 22(d),
it is understandable, in light of the statutory language itself and the
virtuous sounding ring to the phrase "prevention of price discrimin-
ation," that such a reason could materialize as a justification. At
least no strong arguments were put forth against such an analysis.
In the years after 1941, the SEC granted a number of exemp-
tions from the provisions of section 22(d).77 In general, these ex-
emptions permitted reduced sales loads based on the quantity pur-
chased.78  In 1958, the SEC, with the concurrence of the NASD and
the industry in general, adopted rule 22d-1. 9 The rule placed se-
be in effect from 1:00 p.m. until the close of business of the NYSE. This cut the
period of time for which there would be a price lag. The SEC's decision contains
an excellent discussion of the operation of the two-price system. Section 26(e) was
subsequently amended, effective Feb. 8, 1971. NASD, RuLES OF FAiR PRACTICE §
26(e) (Jan. 1, 1973 Reprint of the Manual).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(a), (b) (1970).
76. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Axe Houghton Fund, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release
No. 1505 (Aug. 17, 1950); Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., SEC Inv. Co. Act Release
No. 1504 (Aug. 15, 1950).
78. The initial SEC General Counsel's opinion permitting "quantity discounts," SEC
Inv. Co. Act Release No. 89 (March 13, 1941), permitted discounts for "single in-
vestments." This led to the practice in the industry of permitting wide discretion
in defining what constituted a "single investment." The industry became concerned
because of certain tactics employed in establishing a group for making a "group pur-
chase." Disclosure problems were created since it could not be assured that all mem-
bers of the group would receive a prospectus, and the industry feared the widespread
evasion of section 22(d)'s retail price maintenance provision through the "back door."
79. SEC Inv. Co. Act Release No. 2798 (Dec. 2, 1958), 17 C.F.R. § 270.22d-
1 (1972). Comments were first sought by the SEC from the industry. SEC Inv. Co.
Act Release No. 2718 (1958). The Commission declared, in adopting rule 22d-1,
that the "purposes of the Section are to prevent discrimination among purchasers and
to provide for orderly distribution of such shares by preventing their sale at a price
less than that fixed in the prospectus." SEC Inv. Co. Act Release No. 2798 (Dec. 2,
1958).
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vere restrictions on the situations in which purchasing groups could
obtain exemptions or volume discounts from the uniform sales load.
In the course of adopting rule 22d-1, the SEC received numerous
comments. These written memoranda contain statements purporting
to reveal the purpose or intent of section 22(d). Two of these repre-
sentations appear below:
National Association of Investment Companies Memorandum:
The purposes of Section 22(d) are to insure (a) that there is no
discrimination, as between members of the public, in the prices
at which open-end investment company shares are sold; and (b) to
provide a regulatory framework for the orderly distribution of such
shares. The provisions of the proposed rule, whether interpretative
of section 22(d) or exemptive in nature, should be analyzed in terms
of the purposes underlying Section 22(d).80
National Association of Securities Dealers Preliminary Memorandum:
The Committee believes that the provisions of and policy behind
Section 22(d) require that all members of the investing public must be
entitled to the same price in purchasing at the same time an identical
number of shares of a particular open-end investment company.
In other words, it is in the public interest and necessary for the pro-
tection of the investing public that no member of the investing
public or unrelated group of members of the investment public be
given an advantage price-wise over other members of the investing
public. The Committee believes that Section 22(d) requires this re-
sult even though the prospectus might describe a different public
offering price for different individuals or segments of the investment
public.81
In neither document is there any citation as to the authority
for these propositions. Nevertheless, they were accepted by the SEC,
which paraphrased these statements in the release accompanying the
adoption of the rule.82
At the time these documents were submitted, dilution problems
had been substantially reduced. Therefore, the potential use of sec-
tion 22(d) as a price maintenance device and the subsequently
assumed legislative history of the section seemed to dovetail. The
industry cited the foregoing unsupported assertions as reflecting the
policy rationale of section 22(d), and no one challenged their valid-
80. NAIC Memorandum, June 24, 1958, SEC File No. 57-170-1.
81. Preliminary Memorandum from the NASD to the SEC, August 26, 1957, SEC
File No. 57-170-1.
82. SEC Inv. Co. Act Release No. 2798 (Dec. 2, 1958).
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ity. In fact, in later articles, the NAIC and NASD memorandums
were cited for authority as to the legislative history of section 22(d).88
The SEC in its Public Policy Study, submitted in 1966 to the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, adopted the
reasoning of the industry and the article writers to that date.84 In
the Public Policy Study, the SEC said that the section 22(d) pro-
posal was first suggested by the industry and set forth in a memoran-
dum agreement between the Commission and industry representatives
submitted to Congress. 5  This appears to be correct. The Public
Policy Study goes on to say that the "legislative history is silent on
the reasons for section 22(d)."86 As shown above, this is not cor-
rect, for there is ample indication in the legislative history of at least
a primary objective to curb value dilution of fund shares engendered
by riskless trading around the two-price system. The Public Policy
Study itself states that the abuses cited in the Investment Trust Study
were intended to be eliminated by section 22(d), although the Pol-
icy Study chose to emphasize the bootleg operations of non-contract
dealers as the chief of those abuses.
8 7
Finally, and illustrating the extent to which unsupported state-
ments in industry memoranda can create "instant"' legislative history,
the SEC in January 1972 denied an application for exemption under
section 22(d), in part because it would result in "price discrimination"
based on the sales load charged. 8 The SEC, citing to the language
of the 1958 Release adopting rule 22d-1, also cited an article written
in 1960 which, in turn, had relied on the unsubstantiated NAIC and
NASD memoranda for authority on the legislative purpose of sec-
tion 22(d).89
The authors submit that this result was not intended by the
drafters of section 22(d). If viewed in terms of its legislative his-
tory, section 22(d) is primarily an effort to discourage a form of trading
which permitted an advantage to those who were not required to
pay a full sales load, causing a dilution of the remaining shareholder
interests. A provision such as section 22(d) was originally consid-
ered unnecessary in the framers' eyes, since the problems which were
83. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 10, at 371.
84. Public Policy Study 218-19.
85. Id. at 219.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc., SEC Inv. Co. Act Release No. 6932 (Jan. 12,
1972).
89. Id. at 4, citing Greene, supra note 10, at 371-73.
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the focus of Congress's corrective efforts could have been eliminated
by adopting the "forward pricing" method.90 Such a forward-pricing
structure might not have had the effect on "non-contract" dealers that
was desired by the industry and apparently agreed to by Congress, but
there is no support in any of the published hearings for the argument
that the policy considerations underlying section 22(d) entailed an in-
tention that all people pay the same price for a given mutual fund share
-or that a fixed sales load be imposed on all sales or on all sales of a
given quantity of shares. As the Public Policy Study points out, an in-
vestor who has decided that he will purchase a particular investment com-
pany share, without the benefit of any sales effort by any salesman,
is required under section 22(d) to pay a sales charge "designed to
cover selling efforts that he does not want, does not need and does
not get."91 Similarly, as the SEC report points out, "The retail dealer
who seeks to expand the volume of his business in the traditional
free enterprise way by selling fund shares at lower prices cannot do
In late 1968, the SEC, under the authority granted it pursuant
to section 22(c) of the Act, adopted rule 22c-1 to require all funds
to establish "forward pricing." 3 With the advent of rule 22c-1, any
possible forms of dilution based on the "backward pricing" system
have been eliminated. In view of this, one can only conclude that
some new rationale for a "broad-brush" application of section 22(d)'s
price maintenance provisions must be established-one which was not
contemplated by the framers of the 1940 Act.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING SECTION 22(d)
Recent action in Congress and at the SEC has been aimed at
changing the impact of section 22(d). There appears to be some
divergence of opinion as to the scope and utility of section 22(d),
between and within both bodies.
Congress
In its Public Policy Study, the SEC had expressed strong feelings
in favor of abolishing the retail price maintenance of section 22(d),
90. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
91. Public Policy Study 221. This argument parallels the argument made by in-
dustry representatives, at the time of the enactment of the 1940 Act, where they pointed
out the same fiction with respect to charging a full sales load to insiders and thus
argued for a "placement" or holding period instead of a retail sales maintenance pro-
vision. See note 66 supra and accompaniying text.
92. Id.
93. SEC Inv. Co. Act Release No, 5519 (Oct. 16, 1968).
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but had concluded that a maximum sales load (5 percent) and SEC
authority to vary the statutory maximum would be sufficient to curb
any problems created by the operation of section 22(d).94 Further-
more, the SEC, in the 1967 hearings before the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee on S. 1659 (which embodied the SEC's proposal
for a 5 percent load maximum), had advised Congress that it felt
compelled to accept industry objections to abolition of section 22(d)
and was therefore unwilling to recommend a repeal of that provis-
ion.95 By March of 1969, the Commission had agreed to support the
proposal embodied in S. 34, a substantially amended version of S.
1659, which provided for industry regulation of sales loads with
SEC oversight, rather than for a flat statutory load maximum. 96 On
May 21, 1969, S. 2224, 97 a refined and subdued version of S. 34
was reported out of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee.
The new bill, which resulted in the Investment Company Amend-
ments Act of 1970,98 left section 22(d) virtually untouched, save for
a few minor language changes. The Committee Report stated that
they had "considered the possibility of deleting section 22(d) from
the Act, but that impressive testimony was given that there had not
been sufficient study of the consequences of such an amendment." 99
The SEC in the earlier hearings before the Committee asserted that,
before it could recommend an outright repeal of section 22(d), it
would need to make further studies of the economic impact of such
a move.100 The SEC was requested to prepare such a study, and in
November, 1972 it submitted its report to Congress. 101 This Report
is discussed in detail below.
NASD
The Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, as signed
94. Public Policy Study 222-23.
95. S. 1659 Hearings 50.
96. Hearings on S. 34 and S. 296 Before Senate Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 18-19, 29 (1969).
97. S. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
98. See note 102 infra and accompanying text.
99. S. RP. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969). In this Report, the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency announced that it was requesting the SEC to "re-
view the consequences of such a proposal [repeal of Section 22(d)] on both the
investing public and mutual fund sales organizations and report to it as soon as is
reasonably practicable." Id.
100. See note 96 supra.
101. Staff of the SEC, Report on the Potential Economic Impact of a Repeal of
Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, (Nov., 1972), reprinted in
[1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SF . L. REP. 79,076 (1972).
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into law on December 14, 1970, left section 22(d) untouched, but
authorized registered securities associations (presently only the NASD)
to establish rules prohibiting excessive sales loads.102 The NASD
has prepared and promulgated its study of industry sales loads.10 3
The basic conclusions of this study were (1) that any NASD sales
charge rule should not prescribe a particular formula; and (2) that the
NASD should promulgate rules which reflect consideration of four
standards of reasonableness relating to:
(1) Effective competition
(2) Value of service
(3) Salesman's compensation
(4) Cost of distribution
As a result of this study, the NASD in November, 1972 promulgated
proposed rules establishing maximum sales charges on the sale of
mutual fund shares and variable annuities. 0 4  Basically, under the
mutual fund sales charge limitations, a fund would be limited to a
maximum sales charge of 6 percent unless it offered three specified
services which themselves would, in the aggregate, carry an additional
21/ percentage point value as indicated:
(1) Reinvestment of dividends at net asset value (1 /).
(2) Rights of accumulation (/2).
(3) Quantity discounts on single purchases (34).
If the above three services were offered by a fund, it could establish
a sales load of 8.5 percent. Adoption of some but not all of these
services would put the sales load limitation at somewhere between
6 and 8.5 percent, depending on the service(s) offered. In addition,
the NASD announced at the same time a proposal for limiting sales
charges for variable annuity contracts. 0 5
Strictly speaking, the NASD's proposals are not appropriate topics
for analysis in an article which deals with section 22(d), since the
proposals would not alter the basic price maintenance scheme but sim-
ply place limitations on the uniform prices which can be charged.
However, there seems to be a tendency to associate retail price main-
tenance with high sales loads and concomitantly to prescribe limita-
102. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 12(c),
84 Stat. 1413, 1423.
103. NASD, Economic Study of the Distribution of Mutual Funds and Variable
Annuities (1972), summarized at 2 CCH MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE 1 9465 (1972).
104. NASD Release No. 11,172, reprinted at 2 CCH MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE 9571
(Nov. 8, 1972).
105. Id. at 12,162.
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tions on sales loads as a remedy to the effects of section 22(d).106
The more recent section 22(d) report of the Commission'07 indicates
that removal of section 22(d) would not necessarily reduce sales loads,
so that proponents of the repeal of section 22(d) should not consider
that these proposed Rules would be superfluous if, in fact, section
22(d) is repealed.
The NASD's proposals are apparently framed with an intention
of overcoming the basic objections to section 22(d), while at the
same time retaining some form of its price maintenance structure.
The principal thrust of the proposals is to reject a market structure
where the price outcome would be dependent upon competitiveness
(as would be the case if section 22(d) were eliminated) and to recom-
mend a market structure where the price outcome would be based on
a cost-benefit analysis. The apparent theory behind this approach is
that the open market theory of supply and demand is not valid where, as
in the mutual fund industry, the demand is "supply-oriented." This
approach is a variation on the concept that "mutual fund shares are sold,
not bought." According to this theory a straight reduction in sales
charges resulting from the entry of non-contract cut-price dealers into
the marketplace would actually tend to reduce demand, since supply
would be reduced as a result of the contract dealers' reluctance to de-
vote any time to the sales effort. Arguably, the ultimate result of this
cycle would be that the non-contract dealers, having driven contract
dealers out of the marketplace, would cause funds to enter a net redemp-
tion stage as a result of the lack of sales. Presumably, if one of the rea-
sons for adopting section 22(d), even if not the primary reason, were to
preclude the cut-throat aspects of a secondary market supported by non-
contract dealers, and if the NASD's prognosis is correct, then the con-
tinued prohibition of price competition from non-contract dealers
would be a justifiable reason for retaining at least some of the ele-
ments of section 22(d). But there remains the question of whether
contract dealers should be permitted to sell mutual fund shares at
varying sales loads, while at the same time being precluded from
establishing a secondary market which would tend to have the same
attributes as the "bootleg" market mentioned in the Investment Trust
Study.
SEC
In 1967 and 1968, the prevailing atmosphere at the Commission
106. See text accompanying notes 103-04 supra.
107. Section 22(d) Report, supra note 101, at vi.
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reflected a desire to- weaken the effect of section 22(d). Congress
was asked by Commission spokesmen to establish a maximum sales
load of 5 percent and to give the Commission the power to "vary the
statutory maximum by rule or regulation.' 10 8  The Commission it-
self appeared to be attempting a partial repeal of the retail sales
price maintenance provisions through its rulemaking power. In
October of 1968, the Commission proposed an amendment to rule
22d-1' 0 9 to delete the prohibition on group purchases for the purpose
of obtaining quantity discounts. By using the definition of "person"
in section 2(a) (27) of the 1940 Act, the proposed amendment
would expand the availability of group discounts to "any organized
group of persons whether incorporated or not" and would apparently
permit the aggregation of unrelated purchases by unrelated persons who
are "organized" purely for the purposes of receiving a discounted
price on the mutual fund shares. This proposed amendment came
under attack from some quarters, 110 and apparently the Commission
itself has some serious doubts about its wisdom, since no further
action has been taken, and it remains a "proposed" amendment.
A further indication of the Commission's attitude with respect to
section 22(d), subsequent to the promulgation of the above release,
appeared in the form of exemptions to individual funds, their princi-
pal underwriters, and affiliated companies from the provisions of sec-
tion 22(d). In 1969, Transamerica Capital Fund was granted an
exemption from section 22(d) and permitted to sell its shares, for in-
vestment, at no load to regular employees of the corporations within
the conglomerate structure of Transamerica Corporation."' This ex-
emption apparently was applicable to some 23,000 persons." 2
Once the barriers had been broken by the Transamerica Re-
lease, the Commission began granting further requests for sales load
exemptions to other mutual funds, their principal underwriters and
affiliates.113  The NASD objected to these exemptions when the
Travelers Corporation filed a request similar to the Transamerica re-
108. However, Chairman Cohen, in hearings during 1967, indicated a willingness to
accept NASD regulation of sales loads, provided that the Senate Committee made
it "perfectly clear in its reports that it expects the NASD to undertake this respon-
sibility and to carry it out vigorously and expeditiously." S. 1659 Hearings 46.
109. SEC Inv. Co. Act Release No. 5507 (Oct. 7, 1968).
110. See, e.g., Simpson & Hodes, supra note 10, at 724-28.
111. SEC Inv. Co. Act Release No. 5751 (1969).
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., SEC Inv. Co. Act Releases Nos. 5793 and 5794 (1969), granting
exemption orders under section 22(d) to Fidelity Trend Fund, Inc. and Puritan Fund,
Inc.
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quest.' 14  After some minor changes in the structure of the request,
however, the order was granted with the blessings of the NASD." 5
The SEC continued to grant similar exemption orders, but with
an added condition in the final paragraph. The orders would normal-
ly grant the exemption from section 22(d) which had been requested,
subject to the following condition:
That if in the future the Commission amends Rule 22d-1 to change
the circumstances under which sales charges may be reduced or
eliminated in a manner more restrictive than the circumstances per-
mitted by this order, then on the effective date of such amendment
the exemptions granted by this order shall be automatically ter-
minated, and the Rule as amended shall apply.1 16
The language of the preceding condition hinted at a possible
change in Commission attitudes, at least with respect to the application
of section 22(d) under certain circumstances. The rationale for
granting the exemptions from the uniform load requirements to com-
panies affiliated with the investment manager or principal under-
writer of the fund was based on an extension of the application of
rule 22d-1 (h) providing for reduced or no-load sales in the fol-
lowing situation:
(h) Upon the sale, pursuant to a uniform offer described in the
prospectus, to the directors, officers or partners of the investment
company, its investment adviser or principal underwriter, or to the
bona fide, full-time employees or sales representatives of any of the
foregoing who have acted as such for not less than 90 days, or to
any trust, pension, profit-sharing or other benefit plan for such per-
sons, provided that such sales are made upon written assurance of
the purchaser that the purchase is made for investment purposes,
and that the securities will not be resold except through redemption
or repurchase by or on behalf of the issuer."17
The Commission then took action to implement the "condition"
imposed upon those granted exemptions from section 22(d). In a
release issued on February 8, 1971, the Commission adopted an
amendment to rule 22d-l(h) restricting the applicability of the pro-
114. SEC Inv. Co. Act Release No. 5791 (1969), by which the SEC "noticed" the
application for exemption filed by Travelers Equities Fund, Inc. A request for hearing
was filed by the NASD on October 1, 1969.
115. SEC Inv. Co. Act Release No. 5948 (1969).
116. See, e.g., SEC Inv. Co. Act Releases Nos. 5963 and 6009 (1970), granting
exemption orders to First Fund of Virginia, Inc., and Lincoln National Capital Fund
and Lincoln National Balanced Fund, respectively.
117. 1940 Act rule 22d-1(h), 17 C.F.R. § 270.22d-l1(h) (1972).
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visions of rule 22d-l(h).118  The effect of the amendment was to
reduce the class of persons eligible for discount or no-load sales under
the rule to those who devote at least one-half of their working time
actually performing certain services for the mutual fund or its in-
vestment advisers. The Commission decided that it would be ap-
propriate to limit the applicability of the rule 19 for the following
reason:
In view of the proliferation of insurance companies and conglom-
erate complexes in the investment company industry and the many
thousands of employees and other persons who would be entitled to
special treatment if the Commission continued to grant exemptive
orders in this area, the Commission has reconsidered its position and
believes that it is desirable at this time to restrict the class of persons
eligible for reduced or eliminated sales charges under Rule 22d-1 (h).120
In a recent application for exemption from the provisions of
section 22(d), filed by Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc. (MFA), prior
to the release of the Commission's Section 22(d) Report, the Com-
mission continued to express a restrictive view of rule 22d-1.121
MFA proposed an arrangement under which it would buy shares of
load mutual funds and sell them to an affiliated fund (Fundpack)
at MFA's cost. Fundpack was to be a fund holding company. Sales
to Fundpack would be at net asset value plus that portion of the sales
load allocable to the selling fund's principal underwriter. Since MFA
would not be selling the shares to Fundpack at the public offering
price described in the prospectuses of the mutual funds selling to
MFA, MFA requested an exemption from the provisions of section
22(d) to permit it to sell these shares at other than the public offer-
ing price. The Commission, as indicated above,1 22 denied the ex-
emption, relying in support of its denial on doubtful secondary sources
for the supposed legislative purpose behind section 22(d). 28 It has
been suggested that had MFA's application been filed after comple-
tion of the SEC's Section 22(d) Report, the result might have been
different.124
The Commission's report to Congress on the repeal of section
22(d) appears to bring it full circle back to favoring repeal. While
118. SEC Inv. Co. Act Release No. 6347 (Feb. 8, 1971).
119. Id. See note 7 supra for the details of the rule.
120. Id.
121. SEC Inv. Co. Act Release No. 6932 (Jan. 12, 1972).
122. See notes 88-89 supra.
123. SEC Inv. Co. Act Release No. 6932, at 4 n.7 (Jan. 12, 1972).
124. Hodes, supra note 3, at 1072.
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then Chairman Casey's cover letter to Congress stated that the Section
22(d) Report consists of an "analytical study that makes no rec-
ommendations for legislative or administrative action," his letter goes
on to say that the "findings (of the study) certainly suggest there is
no compelling public interest in continued retail price maintenance"
and that "the repeal of section 22(d) would on balance be desirable."12
The Report's conclusions were as follows:
(1) Impact on investors:
Repeal of section 22(d) would result in lower acquisition costs
generally, but not necessarily for the smaller investors and perhaps
not at all insofar as the cost of shares issued through so-called "cap-
tive organizations."
(2) Impact on mutual fund sales organizations:
Repeal of section 22(d) would have little or no effect on captive
sales organizations or distribution of no-load funds. Almost the en-
tire economic impact would fall on independent broker-dealers who
made three-fourths of all load fund sales in 1970.
(3) Impact on salesmen:
Repeal of section 22(d) would have little impact on full-time
securities salesmen.
(4) Impact on investment company industry:
It is doubtful that repeal of section 22(d) would lead to ex-
tensive industrywide net redemptions and any secondary markets
which might arise would not necessarily create adverse consequences.
(5) Impact on the capital markets and the economy:
According to the Report, "reductions in mutual fund selling com-
pensation would have no significant impact on the stock market or
the economy."' ' 26
Thus, according to the Commission, the impact of repeal of sec-
tion 22(d) would fall almost exclusively on independent broker-
dealers-hardly the class that the section was enacted to protect.
The SEC recently completed hearings designed to elicit the eco-
nomic information which the Commission's 1972 Report suggested
was necessary to a fuller understanding of the repercussions which
repeal of section 22(d) would generate within the industry. In the
announcement of the hearings schedule, the Commission indicated that
it would consider as to section 22(d), inter alia, the issues of com-
125. Section 22(d) Report, supra note 101, at vi.
126. Id. at ifi-x.
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plete repeal, partial repeal, price competition within a limited range,
permitting different "public offering prices" to be described in the
prospectus, and prohibiting price competition from non-contract
dealers. 127  To date, no additional reports have been published by
the Commission with respect to the information obtained through
these hearings, but former (and then) Chairman Cook recently stated
that the Commission's analysis should be complete by the summer of
1973.128
Antitrust Repercussions
In recent months, the most significant developments concerning
section 22(d) have been the filing of class action civil antitrust suits
and a subsequent Justice Department suit against certain mutual funds,
their advisory organizations, their principal underwriters, certain brok-
er-dealers, and the NASD, for alleged violations of the antitrust laws
in connection with the distribution of mutual fund shares. In the
class action suits, the basic claim is that section 22(d) does not im-
pose a limitation on the selling price of fund shares in transactions
through a broker, but only specifies that the public offering price
must be the price at which a dealer offers the shares. Thus, brokers
offering shares of a given mutual fund are not precluded, according
to the complaint, from matching the purchase and sale orders of two
investors represented by the broker on an agency basis.120 The Jus-
tice Department's suit alleged the existence of a conspiracy to deprive
investors of the benefits of a competitive secondary market in fund
shares. The Justice Department did not limit itself to the argument
made in the class action regarding "matching" sales of purchases by
brokers, but claimed that the defendants had prevented a secondary
market from being established among dealers because contractual ar-
rangements (and NASD rules) precluded a dealer from selling to or
purchasing from another dealer. This not only prevented the estab-
lishment of a secondary market, but also, according to the com-
plaint, kept non-contract broker-dealers from purchasing and selling
the particular funds.' 30
127. SEC Inv. Co. Act Release No. 7475 (Nov. 3, 1972).
128. Address by Chairman Cook before Investment Company Institute, May 10, 1973,
summarized in SEC News Digest No. 73-92, at 1 (May 11, 1973).
129. Haddad v. Crosby Corp., Civil Action No. 2454-72 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 1972),
complaint summarized at 2 CCH MuTuAL FUNDs Gum 1 9605. See also Groso v.
NASD, Civil Action No. 426-73 (D.D.C., filed Mar. 1973), complaint summarized
at 2 CCII MuTuAL FuNDs GumE 9642 (1973).
130. United States v. NASD, Civil Action No. 339-73 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 21, 1973),
complaint reprinted at 2 CCH MTrruAL FuNDs GuiD 9628 (1973).
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CONCLUSION
Permissible resale price maintenance arrangements in our eco-
nomic system are an exception to the general rule of allowing com-
petition to establish price levels. Where resale price maintenance is
permitted, such as under state fair trade laws, there usually has been
a clear and thorough legislative consideration given the matter before
permitting such arrangements to exist. In other instances, such as
in the case of commission rates for stock exchanges,1 31 agencies
charged with licensing or other regulatory authorities have been obli-
gated to consider antitrust principles, along with the other legitimate
competing interests of the industry and the public.' 32 Normally, the
pros and cons of such anti-competitive devices are considered either
by Congress, or the agency involved, in light of the potential anti-
trust implications. Section 22(d) operates as a resale price main-
tenance provision, yet it was given only cursory consideration as to
its overall impact on sales competitiveness. It is a provision adopted
to eliminate a trading problem wholly unrelated to any concepts of
price discrimination, and without apparent consideration of its anti-
competitive nature. There may well be valid and legitimate reasons for
continuing the retail price structure imposed by the section, but it can-
not be asserted that such reasons are to be found in the Act's legisla-
tive history, which reveals an intent to solve the problem of dilution
of mutual fund assets.
Any legislative or administrative action taken in this area, how-
ever, must consider that the mutual fund business has accommodated
itself to section 22(d). If the slate were clean, there might be no eco-
nomic justification which could support such a sweeping exception to the
antitrust laws; but the continued vitality of the huge mutual fund indus-
try, if truly dependent upon such a pricing structure, may dictate the
continued existence of at least some form of price maintenance. 133 The
Economic Report of the President for 1970 contains a comment which
appears particularly relevant to the consideration of section 22(d) in
131. The SEC, in section 19(b)(9) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, is
vested with authority to alter or supplement the rules of a stock exchange with respect
to "the fixing of reasonable rates of commission, interest, listing, and other charges.
." 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(9) (1970).
132. See, e.g., Gulf State Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973); Silver v. NYSE,
373 U.S. 341, 359-60 (1963).
133. The hearings in the Senate and House on S. 34 and S. 1659, see text accom-
panying notes 95-96 supra, contain strong industry testimonials as to the need for retail
price maintenance in sale of mutual fund shares. See, e.g., Report to the Board of Gov-
ernors of the NASD on Economic Consequences for the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission in its Report to Congress Entitled "Public Policy Implications of Investment
Company Growth," S. 1659 Hearings 578.
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light of its legislative history and purpose:
Sometimes regulations created to protect the public against mal-
practices are extended and used to restrict new entry into a market.
Regulations also often prescribe or support minimum or maximum
prices. The Investment Company Act of 1940 in effect establishes
a resale price maintenance law for mutual funds that prevents retail
dealers of mutual funds from charging lower commissions ...
The problem is to make certain that "fairness" in setting rates does
not put an umbrella over inefficiency, and that "soundness" in finan-
cial institutions does not become a pretext for impeding competition
and innovation. 134
There would seem to be two possibilities under the circum-
stances:
(1) Repeal section 22(d) and replace it with a provision de-
signed to safeguard the distribution of mutual fund shares through
contract dealers. Maximum sales loads would continue to be applied
either under the NASD's cost-benefit analysis or something compar-
able to it. Shares could only be purchased to fill orders already re-
ceived, and a secondary market would be precluded. While such a
limited repeal of section 22(d) might not create the type of competi-
tion among dealers which would result from a complete repeal, it
would give mutual funds, their principal underwriters and individual
contract dealers more flexibility in the marketing of their shares while
preserving the basic distribution structure. Balanced against this po-
sition are the arguments that such a repeal would probably not result
in a reduction of sales charges to small investors and that, presumably
because of the effect as to larger investors, it would weaken the entire
industry by driving the small retail dealers away from mutual funds
and into other products having a higher sales load.
(2) Retain section 22(d) but apply it with the liberality deserv-
ing of its history. As an initial move in that direction, relaxation of
SEC rules on group sales in line with the proposed amendment of rule
22d-1 would seem appropriate. Moreover, consistent with the NASD's
view that the price of fund shares should reflect a cost-benefit analysis
as well as some consideration of the amount of time and effort going into
the sales process, where a mutual fund and its principal underwriter can
demonstrate reduced sales expense or reduced benefits made available,
then a reduced sales cost would seem appropriate. In cases such as
these, the Commission should not feel obliged to adhere to a strict appli-
cation of section 22(d) because of considerations of price discrimina-
tion, since such considerations were never intended to be controlling in
the interpretation of section 22(d).
134. Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers 101-03 (Jan. 29, 1970).
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